fix: control port needs a per-launch token; MCP tool annotations tell the whole truth (#205) (#901)

solidcraft --control PORT writes a random per-launch token to a user-only file (<data>/control/PORT.token; 0700/0600 on Unix, icacls on Windows; SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN overrides) and refuses any connection whose first request lacks it. mcp --connect, the demo and packaging smoke clients send it. MCP execute/batch/open/save/export/screenshot are annotated destructive and open-world, new_design destructive. Docs: control-protocol.md, mcp.md, AGENTS.md, pending release note in releasing.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

AGENTS.md

@@ -122,7 +122,10 @@ before the draft is verified.
 ## Running and looking at the app
 - `cargo run --release -p solidcraft -- --sample --control PORT` (sample design + control channel).
   Pick a free port. Without a display, run it under `Xvfb :99` with `DISPLAY=:99`.
-- Drive it with JSON lines on `127.0.0.1:PORT` (see `docs/control-protocol.md`):
+- Drive it with JSON lines on `127.0.0.1:PORT` (see `docs/control-protocol.md`). The first
+  request on a connection carries the launch's token as `"token"`: read it from
+  `~/.local/share/solidcraft/control/PORT.token`, or start the app with
+  `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32)` and send that.
   - `{"id":1,"method":"engine.execute","params":{"command":"solid.extrude","params":{"distance":20}}}`
   - `{"id":2,"method":"ui.start","params":{"command":"sketch.create"}}` then `ui.click {x, y}`
   - `{"id":3,"method":"ui.screenshot","params":{"path":"/tmp/shot.png"}}` then read the PNG.

CLAUDE.md

@@ -99,7 +99,10 @@ before the draft is verified.
 ## Running and looking at the app
 - `cargo run --release -p solidcraft -- --sample --control PORT` (sample design + control channel).
   Pick a free port. Without a display, run it under `Xvfb :99` with `DISPLAY=:99`.
-- Drive it with JSON lines on `127.0.0.1:PORT` (see `docs/control-protocol.md`):
+- Drive it with JSON lines on `127.0.0.1:PORT` (see `docs/control-protocol.md`). The first
+  request on a connection carries the launch's token as `"token"`: read it from
+  `~/.local/share/solidcraft/control/PORT.token`, or start the app with
+  `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN=$(openssl rand -hex 32)` and send that.
   - `{"id":1,"method":"engine.execute","params":{"command":"solid.extrude","params":{"distance":20}}}`
   - `{"id":2,"method":"ui.start","params":{"command":"sketch.create"}}` then `ui.click {x, y}`
   - `{"id":3,"method":"ui.screenshot","params":{"path":"/tmp/shot.png"}}` then read the PNG.

Cargo.lock

@@ -3286,6 +3286,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "eframe",
  "egui",
  "embed-resource",
+ "getrandom 0.3.4",
  "hidapi",
  "log",
  "quick-xml",

apps/solidcraft-cli/src/main.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 //! solidcraft-cli commands                                     the command registry as JSON
 //! solidcraft-cli recipe <recipe.json>                         translate an oracle recipe to a script
 //! solidcraft-cli oracle <case-dir>...                         replay recipes and compare with expected.json
-//! solidcraft-cli mcp [--in design|script] [--connect HOST:PORT] [--allow-path DIR]... [--allow-any-path]
+//! solidcraft-cli mcp [--in design|script] [--connect HOST:PORT [--token T]] [--allow-path DIR]... [--allow-any-path]
 //!                                                             MCP server on stdio (docs/mcp.md)
 //! solidcraft-cli licences                                     SolidCraft's licence and the third-party licences
 //! solidcraft-cli icon --out F.png|F.ico [--size N]             the app icon (packaging; drawn, not a file)
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ const USAGE: &str = "usage:
   solidcraft-cli recipe <recipe.json>
   solidcraft-cli oracle <case-dir>... [--json]
   solidcraft-cli fuzz [--from N] [--count N] [--jobs J] [--timeout S] [--steps N] [--minimise] [--out DIR] [--report FILE]
-  solidcraft-cli mcp [--in design.solidcraft|script.json] [--connect 127.0.0.1:PORT] [--allow-path DIR]... [--allow-any-path]
+  solidcraft-cli mcp [--in design.solidcraft|script.json] [--connect 127.0.0.1:PORT [--token T]] [--allow-path DIR]... [--allow-any-path]
   solidcraft-cli crashes [list [--json] | show <id> | replay <id> | dir | clear [<id>]]
   solidcraft-cli licences
   solidcraft-cli icon --out icon.png [--size 256] | --out icon.ico
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ fn cmd_mcp(args: &[String]) -> Result<(), String> {
     }
     let backend: Box<dyn solidcraft_mcp::Backend> = match (flag(args, "--connect"), flag(args, "--in")) {
         (Some(_), Some(_)) => return Err("mcp: use either --connect or --in, not both".into()),
-        (Some(addr), None) => Box::new(solidcraft_mcp::Remote::connect(addr).map_err(|e| {
+        (Some(addr), None) => Box::new(solidcraft_mcp::Remote::connect_with_token(addr, flag(args, "--token")).map_err(|e| {
             let port = addr.rsplit(':').next().filter(|p| p.parse::<u16>().is_ok()).unwrap_or("PORT");
             format!(
                 "cannot connect to {addr}: {e}\nno SolidCraft app is listening there; start it with \

apps/solidcraft/Cargo.toml

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ egui = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }
 log = { workspace = true }
 rfd = { workspace = true }
+getrandom = "0.3"
 
 [target.'cfg(any(target_os = "windows", target_os = "linux"))'.dependencies]
 quick-xml = { workspace = true }

apps/solidcraft/src/control_server.rs

@@ -9,18 +9,39 @@ use std::time::Duration;
 
 use serde_json::{Value, json};
 use solidcraft_engine::MAX_LINE;
+use solidcraft_engine::control_auth;
 use solidcraft_ui_egui::ControlRequest;
 
-/// Connections served at once. The channel has no authentication beyond being bound to
+/// Connections served at once, so a flood must not be able to spawn threads without end.
-/// loopback, so a flood must not be able to spawn threads without end.
 const MAX_CONNECTIONS: usize = 16;
 /// Lines that are not JSON before the connection is closed, so garbage cannot loop forever.
 const MAX_BAD_LINES: usize = 8;
 
 static OPEN: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
+/// The token file this launch wrote, removed when the app ends.
+static TOKEN_FILE: std::sync::OnceLock<std::path::PathBuf> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();
+
+/// A new random token: 32 bytes from the operating system, as hex.
+fn new_token() -> Option<String> {
+    let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
+    getrandom::fill(&mut bytes).ok()?;
+    Some(bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect())
+}
+
+/// Remove this launch's token file (at exit).
+pub fn remove_token_file() {
+    if let Some(p) = TOKEN_FILE.get() {
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(p);
+    }
+}
 
 pub fn start(port: u16, ctx: egui::Context) -> Receiver<ControlRequest> {
     let (tx, rx) = channel::<ControlRequest>();
+    // Every connection must show the token before anything runs (docs/control-protocol.md).
+    let Some(token) = control_auth::env_token().or_else(new_token) else {
+        eprintln!("solidcraft: control server not started: no random token available");
+        return rx;
+    };
     let listener = match TcpListener::bind(("127.0.0.1", port)) {
         Ok(l) => l,
         Err(e) => {
@@ -28,7 +49,23 @@ pub fn start(port: u16, ctx: egui::Context) -> Receiver<ControlRequest> {
             return rx;
         }
     };
-    eprintln!("solidcraft: control server listening on 127.0.0.1:{port}");
+    match control_auth::token_path(port) {
+        Some(path) => match control_auth::write_token_file(&path, &token) {
+            Ok(()) => {
+                eprintln!("solidcraft: control server listening on 127.0.0.1:{port} (token in {})", path.display());
+                let _ = TOKEN_FILE.set(path);
+            }
+            Err(e) => eprintln!(
+                "solidcraft: control server listening on 127.0.0.1:{port}, but its token file {} could not be written ({e}); \
+                 clients need SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN",
+                path.display()
+            ),
+        },
+        None => {
+            eprintln!("solidcraft: control server listening on 127.0.0.1:{port}; no data folder for its token, clients need SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN")
+        }
+    }
+    let token = std::sync::Arc::new(token);
     std::thread::spawn(move || {
         for stream in listener.incoming().flatten() {
             if OPEN.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) >= MAX_CONNECTIONS {
@@ -39,8 +76,9 @@ pub fn start(port: u16, ctx: egui::Context) -> Receiver<ControlRequest> {
             }
             let tx = tx.clone();
             let ctx = ctx.clone();
+            let token = token.clone();
             std::thread::spawn(move || {
-                serve(stream, tx, ctx);
+                serve(stream, &token, tx, ctx);
                 OPEN.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
             });
         }
@@ -80,11 +118,17 @@ fn read_line(r: &mut impl BufRead, max: usize) -> std::io::Result<Option<Vec<u8>
     }
 }
 
-fn serve(stream: TcpStream, tx: Sender<ControlRequest>, ctx: egui::Context) {
+/// The reply to a connection that didn't show the token; the connection is then closed.
+fn unauthorized() -> Value {
+    json!({"ok": false, "error": "unauthorized: send the control token as \"token\" (see docs/control-protocol.md)"})
+}
+
+fn serve(stream: TcpStream, token: &str, tx: Sender<ControlRequest>, ctx: egui::Context) {
     let Ok(read) = stream.try_clone() else { return };
     let mut out = stream;
     let mut reader = BufReader::new(read);
     let mut bad = 0usize;
+    let mut authenticated = false;
     loop {
         let line = match read_line(&mut reader, MAX_LINE) {
             Ok(Some(l)) => String::from_utf8_lossy(&l).into_owned(),
@@ -99,6 +143,16 @@ fn serve(stream: TcpStream, tx: Sender<ControlRequest>, ctx: egui::Context) {
         }
         let reply = match serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&line) {
             Ok(msg) => {
+                // The first request must carry the token; later ones on the same connection may.
+                if !authenticated {
+                    match msg.get("token").and_then(Value::as_str) {
+                        Some(t) if control_auth::tokens_match(t, token) => authenticated = true,
+                        _ => {
+                            let _ = writeln!(out, "{}", unauthorized());
+                            break;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
                 let id = msg.get("id").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null);
                 let method = msg.get("method").and_then(Value::as_str).unwrap_or("").to_string();
                 let params = msg.get("params").cloned().unwrap_or(json!({}));
@@ -113,6 +167,10 @@ fn serve(stream: TcpStream, tx: Sender<ControlRequest>, ctx: egui::Context) {
                 }
                 r
             }
+            Err(_) if !authenticated => {
+                let _ = writeln!(out, "{}", unauthorized());
+                break;
+            }
             Err(e) => {
                 bad += 1;
                 json!({"ok": false, "error": format!("bad JSON: {e}")})
@@ -131,6 +189,62 @@ fn serve(stream: TcpStream, tx: Sender<ControlRequest>, ctx: egui::Context) {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    /// #205: a connection runs nothing until a request carries the launch's token; a wrong or
+    /// missing token, or garbage, is refused and the connection closed. Once shown, the token
+    /// need not be repeated on that connection.
+    #[test]
+    fn requests_run_only_after_the_token() {
+        use std::io::Read;
+        let token = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
+        let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+        let (tx, rx) = channel::<ControlRequest>();
+        let ran = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::<String>::new()));
+        let seen = ran.clone();
+        std::thread::spawn(move || {
+            for req in rx {
+                seen.lock().unwrap().push(req.method.clone());
+                let _ = req.reply.send(json!({"ok": true, "result": null}));
+            }
+        });
+        std::thread::spawn(move || {
+            for stream in listener.incoming().flatten() {
+                let tx = tx.clone();
+                std::thread::spawn(move || serve(stream, token, tx, egui::Context::default()));
+            }
+        });
+        let session = |lines: &[String]| {
+            let mut s = TcpStream::connect(addr).unwrap();
+            s.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(10))).unwrap();
+            for l in lines {
+                let _ = writeln!(s, "{l}");
+            }
+            let _ = s.shutdown(std::net::Shutdown::Write);
+            let mut text = String::new();
+            let _ = s.read_to_string(&mut text);
+            text.lines().map(|l| serde_json::from_str::<Value>(l).unwrap()).collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        };
+        for first in [
+            json!({"id": 1, "method": "app.quit", "params": {"force": true}}).to_string(),
+            json!({"id": 1, "method": "app.quit", "token": "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdee"}).to_string(),
+            json!({"id": 1, "method": "app.quit", "token": "0123"}).to_string(),
+            json!({"id": 1, "method": "app.quit", "token": 7}).to_string(),
+            "not json".to_string(),
+        ] {
+            let replies = session(&[first.clone(), json!({"id": 2, "method": "app.quit", "token": token}).to_string()]);
+            assert_eq!(replies.len(), 1, "{first}: closed after refusing: {replies:?}");
+            assert!(replies[0]["error"].as_str().is_some_and(|e| e.starts_with("unauthorized")), "{first}: {replies:?}");
+        }
+        assert!(ran.lock().unwrap().is_empty(), "nothing ran without the token");
+        let replies = session(&[
+            json!({"id": 1, "method": "ui.inspect", "token": token}).to_string(),
+            json!({"id": 2, "method": "engine.commands"}).to_string(),
+        ]);
+        assert_eq!(replies.len(), 2, "{replies:?}");
+        assert!(replies.iter().all(|r| r["ok"] == true), "{replies:?}");
+        assert_eq!(*ran.lock().unwrap(), ["ui.inspect", "engine.commands"]);
+    }
+
     /// A request longer than the cap is refused instead of allocated.
     #[test]
     fn lines_past_the_cap_are_refused() {

apps/solidcraft/src/main.rs

@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ fn main() -> eframe::Result {
             b.with_x11();
         }));
     }
-    eframe::run_native(
+    let result = eframe::run_native(
         "SolidCraft",
         options,
         Box::new(move |cc| {
@@ -344,7 +344,9 @@ fn main() -> eframe::Result {
                 space_mouse,
             }))
         }),
-    )
+    );
+    control_server::remove_token_file();
+    result
 }
 
 /// Whether to run through XWayland rather than native Wayland. winit has no file drag-and-drop

crates/engine/src/control_auth.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+//! The control channel's per-launch token (docs/control-protocol.md). `solidcraft --control PORT`
+//! makes a random token, writes it to a file only the user can read
+//! ([`token_path`]) and refuses every connection whose first request doesn't carry it, so other
+//! users on the same machine (loopback is shared, on Windows across remote-desktop sessions too)
+//! can't drive the app. Clients find it with [`client_token`].
+
+use std::io::{Error, ErrorKind, Result, Write};
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+/// Shortest token accepted from `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN` (hex characters).
+pub const MIN_TOKEN_LEN: usize = 32;
+
+/// The token file of the app listening on `port`: `<data folder>/control/<port>.token`
+/// (`SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_DIR` replaces the folder).
+pub fn token_path(port: u16) -> Option<PathBuf> {
+    let dir = match solidcraft_geom::env::var_os("CONTROL_DIR").filter(|d| !d.is_empty()) {
+        Some(d) => PathBuf::from(d),
+        None => crate::recovery::data_dir()?.join("control"),
+    };
+    Some(dir.join(format!("{port}.token")))
+}
+
+/// A token set on purpose with `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN` (test harnesses, sandboxed packages
+/// whose data folder the client can't see), if it is long enough.
+pub fn env_token() -> Option<String> {
+    solidcraft_geom::env::var("CONTROL_TOKEN").map(|t| t.trim().to_string()).filter(|t| t.len() >= MIN_TOKEN_LEN)
+}
+
+/// The token a client sends to the app on `port`: `explicit` (`--token`), else
+/// `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN`, else the app's token file.
+pub fn client_token(port: u16, explicit: Option<&str>) -> Option<String> {
+    if let Some(t) = explicit.map(str::trim).filter(|t| !t.is_empty()) {
+        return Some(t.to_string());
+    }
+    if let Some(t) = env_token() {
+        return Some(t);
+    }
+    // Read directly, not through `vfs`: the app's own file, outside any agent's folders.
+    let text = std::fs::read_to_string(token_path(port)?).ok().filter(|t| t.len() <= 4096)?;
+    Some(text.trim().to_string()).filter(|t| !t.is_empty())
+}
+
+/// `a == b`, taking the same time wherever they differ.
+pub fn tokens_match(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
+    let (a, b) = (a.as_bytes(), b.as_bytes());
+    a.len() == b.len() && a.iter().zip(b).fold(0u8, |acc, (x, y)| acc | (x ^ y)) == 0
+}
+
+/// Write `token` to `path`, readable and writable only by the user: the folder is made `0700`
+/// and the file `0600` on Unix; on Windows the file's inherited permissions are replaced by one
+/// entry for the user (`icacls`) before the token goes in. A file left by an earlier launch is
+/// replaced.
+pub fn write_token_file(path: &Path, token: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    let dir = path.parent().ok_or_else(|| Error::new(ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "no folder"))?;
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(dir)?;
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);
+    let mut opts = std::fs::OpenOptions::new();
+    opts.write(true).create_new(true);
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::{OpenOptionsExt, PermissionsExt};
+        std::fs::set_permissions(dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700))?;
+        opts.mode(0o600);
+    }
+    let mut f = opts.open(path)?;
+    #[cfg(windows)]
+    restrict_to_user(path)?;
+    f.write_all(token.as_bytes())?;
+    f.write_all(b"\n")?;
+    f.sync_all()
+}
+
+/// Windows: drop inherited entries and grant only the current user full access.
+#[cfg(windows)]
+fn restrict_to_user(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    use std::os::windows::process::CommandExt;
+    let user = std::env::var("USERNAME").map_err(|_| Error::other("USERNAME is not set"))?;
+    let domain = std::env::var("USERDOMAIN").ok().filter(|d| !d.is_empty());
+    let who = domain.map_or(user.clone(), |d| format!("{d}\\{user}"));
+    let status = std::process::Command::new("icacls")
+        .arg(path)
+        .args(["/inheritance:r", "/grant:r", &format!("{who}:F")])
+        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
+        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
+        .creation_flags(0x0800_0000)
+        .status()?;
+    if status.success() { Ok(()) } else { Err(Error::other(format!("icacls failed to restrict {}", path.display()))) }
+}
+
+/// Removes the token file when the app ends.
+pub struct TokenFile(pub PathBuf);
+
+impl Drop for TokenFile {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&self.0);
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tokens_compare_whole() {
+        assert!(tokens_match("abc123", "abc123"));
+        assert!(!tokens_match("abc123", "abc124"));
+        assert!(!tokens_match("abc123", "abc12"));
+        assert!(!tokens_match("", "a"));
+    }
+
+    /// The token file is the user's alone, and a client reads it back.
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn the_token_file_is_private_to_the_user() {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("solidcraft-control-auth-{}", std::process::id()));
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+        let path = dir.join("control/7878.token");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("control")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(&path, "stale").unwrap();
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o644)).unwrap();
+        write_token_file(&path, "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef").unwrap();
+        let mode = |p: &Path| std::fs::metadata(p).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
+        assert_eq!(mode(&path), 0o600);
+        assert_eq!(mode(path.parent().unwrap()), 0o700);
+        assert_eq!(std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap().trim(), "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
+        drop(TokenFile(path.clone()));
+        assert!(!path.exists());
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+    }
+}

crates/engine/src/lib.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #![forbid(unsafe_code)]
 
 pub mod cmd;
+pub mod control_auth;
 pub mod crash;
 pub mod frames;
 pub mod fuzz;

crates/engine/src/recovery.rs

@@ -46,6 +46,21 @@ pub fn default_dir() -> Option<PathBuf> {
     Some(dir)
 }
 
+/// SolidCraft's per-user data folder (the recovery folder's parent unless
+/// `SOLIDCRAFT_RECOVERY_DIR` moves that): `%LOCALAPPDATA%\SolidCraft`,
+/// `~/Library/Application Support/SolidCraft`, or `$XDG_DATA_HOME/solidcraft`
+/// (`~/.local/share/solidcraft`).
+pub fn data_dir() -> Option<PathBuf> {
+    let env = |k: &str| std::env::var_os(k).filter(|d| !d.is_empty()).map(PathBuf::from);
+    if cfg!(windows) {
+        Some(env("LOCALAPPDATA")?.join("SolidCraft"))
+    } else if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
+        Some(env("HOME")?.join("Library/Application Support/SolidCraft"))
+    } else {
+        Some(env("XDG_DATA_HOME").or_else(|| env("HOME").map(|h| h.join(".local/share")))?.join("solidcraft"))
+    }
+}
+
 /// The recovery folder under the per-user data `root`, and the folder earlier releases used.
 /// Windows and macOS name the app's folder in title case, other systems in lower case.
 fn dirs_under(root: &Path, title_case: bool) -> (PathBuf, PathBuf) {

crates/mcp/src/backend.rs

@@ -31,11 +31,22 @@ pub struct Remote {
     addr: String,
     conn: Option<(BufReader<TcpStream>, TcpStream)>,
     next_id: u64,
+    /// The app's control token, sent with every request (docs/control-protocol.md).
+    token: Option<String>,
 }
 
 impl Remote {
+    /// Connect to the app at `addr`, with its control token found the usual way
+    /// (`SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN`, else the app's token file for that port).
     pub fn connect(addr: &str) -> std::io::Result<Self> {
-        let mut r = Self { addr: addr.to_string(), conn: None, next_id: 1 };
+        Self::connect_with_token(addr, None)
+    }
+
+    /// [`Remote::connect`] with the token given (`--token`); `None` finds it the usual way.
+    pub fn connect_with_token(addr: &str, token: Option<&str>) -> std::io::Result<Self> {
+        let port = addr.rsplit(':').next().and_then(|p| p.parse::<u16>().ok()).unwrap_or(0);
+        let token = solidcraft_engine::control_auth::client_token(port, token);
+        let mut r = Self { addr: addr.to_string(), conn: None, next_id: 1, token };
         r.reconnect()?;
         Ok(r)
     }
@@ -95,7 +106,11 @@ impl Backend for Remote {
         if let (Some(scope), Some(o)) = (solidcraft_engine::io::vfs::current_scope(), params.as_object_mut()) {
             o.insert("allow_paths".into(), json!(scope.roots().iter().map(|r| r.to_string_lossy()).collect::<Vec<_>>()));
         }
-        let line = json!({"id": id, "method": method, "params": params}).to_string();
+        let mut msg = json!({"id": id, "method": method, "params": params});
+        if let Some(t) = &self.token {
+            msg["token"] = json!(t);
+        }
+        let line = msg.to_string();
         let reply = match self.roundtrip(&line) {
             Ok(r) => r,
             // One retry on a fresh connection (the app may have restarted).

crates/mcp/src/tests.rs

@@ -544,13 +544,17 @@ fn a_bridged_request_carries_the_agents_folders() {
         let mut line = String::new();
         BufReader::new(stream.try_clone().unwrap()).read_line(&mut line).unwrap();
         let req: Value = serde_json::from_str(&line).unwrap();
-        writeln!(&stream, "{}", json!({"id": req["id"], "ok": true, "result": req["params"]})).unwrap();
+        let mut result = req["params"].clone();
+        result["sent_token"] = req["token"].clone();
+        writeln!(&stream, "{}", json!({"id": req["id"], "ok": true, "result": result})).unwrap();
     });
-    let mut b = crate::Remote::connect(&addr).unwrap();
+    // The app's control token goes with the request too (#205).
+    let mut b = crate::Remote::connect_with_token(&addr, Some("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef")).unwrap();
     let dir = std::fs::canonicalize(std::env::temp_dir()).unwrap();
     let got = scoped(Some(PathScope::new([dir.clone()])), || crate::Backend::call(&mut b, "engine.execute", json!({"command": "file.new"}))).unwrap();
     assert_eq!(got["allow_paths"], json!([dir.to_string_lossy()]), "{got}");
     assert_eq!(got["command"], "file.new");
+    assert_eq!(got["sent_token"], "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
     echo.join().unwrap();
 }
 
@@ -862,3 +866,27 @@ fn instructions_name_only_real_tools() {
         assert!(tools.iter().any(|t| t == name), "the instructions name `{name}`, which is not a tool");
     }
 }
+
+/// Tool annotations never understate what a tool may do (#205): `screenshot` writes a file when
+/// given a `path`, and `execute`, `batch`, `save`, `export` and `open` can overwrite or delete
+/// files, so none of them is read-only and all are destructive and reach the file system.
+#[test]
+fn tool_annotations_tell_the_whole_truth() {
+    let tools = crate::tool_definitions();
+    let hints = |name: &str| {
+        let t = tools.iter().find(|t| t["name"] == name).unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("no tool {name}"));
+        let a = &t["annotations"];
+        (a["readOnlyHint"].as_bool().unwrap(), a["destructiveHint"].as_bool().unwrap(), a["openWorldHint"].as_bool().unwrap())
+    };
+    for name in ["execute", "batch", "save", "export", "open", "screenshot"] {
+        assert_eq!(hints(name), (false, true, true), "{name}");
+    }
+    for name in ["list_commands", "inspect_design", "measure", "body_topology", "crash_reports"] {
+        assert_eq!(hints(name), (true, false, false), "{name}");
+    }
+    assert_eq!(hints("new_design"), (false, true, false));
+    for name in ["set_parameter", "undo", "redo"] {
+        assert_eq!(hints(name), (false, false, false), "{name}");
+    }
+    assert!(tools.iter().all(|t| t["annotations"]["readOnlyHint"].is_boolean()), "every tool is annotated");
+}

crates/mcp/src/tools.rs

@@ -23,13 +23,33 @@ fn obj(props: Value, required: &[&str]) -> Value {
     o
 }
 
-fn tool(name: &str, title: &str, desc: &str, schema: Value, read_only: bool, destructive: bool) -> Value {
+/// What a tool may do, for the client's approval prompts (MCP tool annotations). Clients that
+/// auto-approve on these hints must not be told less than the truth (#205).
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+enum Effect {
+    /// Only looks.
+    ReadOnly,
+    /// Changes the design in memory, undoably.
+    Edits,
+    /// Replaces the design in memory (unsaved changes are lost).
+    Replaces,
+    /// May read, write, overwrite or delete files on disk (any command, a file path).
+    Files,
+}
+
+fn tool(name: &str, title: &str, desc: &str, schema: Value, effect: Effect) -> Value {
+    let (read_only, destructive, open_world) = match effect {
+        Effect::ReadOnly => (true, false, false),
+        Effect::Edits => (false, false, false),
+        Effect::Replaces => (false, true, false),
+        Effect::Files => (false, true, true),
+    };
     json!({
         "name": name,
         "title": title,
         "description": desc,
         "inputSchema": schema,
-        "annotations": {"title": title, "readOnlyHint": read_only, "destructiveHint": destructive, "idempotentHint": read_only, "openWorldHint": false},
+        "annotations": {"title": title, "readOnlyHint": read_only, "destructiveHint": destructive, "idempotentHint": read_only, "openWorldHint": open_world},
     })
 }
 
@@ -49,8 +69,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {
              substring `filter` over id, label, tab and panel (not the parameter docs, so a command id \
              finds that command rather than every command whose docs mention it).",
             obj(json!({"filter": string("Substring to match, e.g. \"sketch\", \"fillet\", \"pattern\"")}), &[]),
-            true,
+            Effect::ReadOnly,
-            false,
         ),
         tool(
             "execute",
@@ -73,8 +92,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {
                 }),
                 &["command"],
             ),
-            false,
+            Effect::Files,
-            false,
         ),
         tool(
             "batch",
@@ -95,8 +113,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {
                 }),
                 &["commands"],
             ),
-            false,
+            Effect::Files,
-            false,
         ),
         tool(
             "inspect_design",
@@ -112,8 +129,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {
                 }),
                 &[],
             ),
-            true,
+            Effect::ReadOnly,
-            false,
         ),
         tool(
             "measure",
@@ -121,8 +137,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {
             "Volume (mm³), surface area (mm²), centre of mass, bounding box and face/edge/vertex counts of one body or all \
              bodies, with totals.",
             obj(json!({"body": string("Body name (default: all bodies)")}), &[]),
-            true,
+            Effect::ReadOnly,
-            false,
         ),
         tool(
             "body_topology",
@@ -130,8 +145,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {
             "The edges (index, midpoint, length, endpoints) and faces (index, area, centroid, plane normal) of a body. Use \
              an edge midpoint as the [x,y,z] point that picks the edge for fillet and chamfer.",
             obj(json!({"body": string("Body name, e.g. \"Body1\"")}), &["body"]),
-            true,
+            Effect::ReadOnly,
-            false,
         ),
         tool(
             "set_parameter",
@@ -148,8 +162,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {
                 }),
                 &["name", "value"],
             ),
-            false,
+            Effect::Edits,
-            false,
         ),
         tool(
             "screenshot",
@@ -171,8 +184,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {
                 }),
                 &[],
             ),
-            true,
+            Effect::Files,
-            false,
         ),
         tool(
             "export",
@@ -187,8 +199,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {
                 }),
                 &["path"],
             ),
-            false,
+            Effect::Files,
-            false,
         ),
         tool(
             "crash_reports",
@@ -205,18 +216,16 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {
                 }),
                 &[],
             ),
-            true,
+            Effect::ReadOnly,
-            false,
         ),
-        tool("undo", "Undo", "Undo the last change to the design.", obj(json!({}), &[]), false, false),
+        tool("undo", "Undo", "Undo the last change to the design.", obj(json!({}), &[]), Effect::Edits),
-        tool("redo", "Redo", "Redo the last undone change.", obj(json!({}), &[]), false, false),
+        tool("redo", "Redo", "Redo the last undone change.", obj(json!({}), &[]), Effect::Edits),
         tool(
             "new_design",
             "New design",
             "Start a new, empty design (unsaved changes to the current one are discarded).",
             obj(json!({"name": string("Design name (default Untitled)")}), &[]),
-            false,
+            Effect::Replaces,
-            true,
         ),
         tool(
             "open",
@@ -225,8 +234,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {
              Import base feature) or a 3MF/STL mesh (.3mf/.stl: mesh bodies). Replaces the current design; insert into it \
              instead with the file.insert_step (STEP) or file.insert_mesh (3MF/STL) commands.",
             obj(json!({"path": string("Path to a .solidcraft, .step/.stp, .3mf or .stl file")}), &["path"]),
-            false,
+            Effect::Files,
-            true,
         ),
         tool(
             "save",
@@ -236,8 +244,7 @@ pub fn tool_definitions() -> Vec<Value> {
                 json!({"path": string("Path to save to (default: the current file)"), "format": {"type": "string", "enum": ["container", "json"], "description": "Design encoding (default: JSON for .json, container otherwise)"}}),
                 &[],
             ),
-            false,
+            Effect::Files,
-            false,
         ),
     ]
 }

docs/control-protocol.md

@@ -6,6 +6,42 @@ line `{"id": …, "ok": true, "result": …}` or `{"id": …, "ok": false, "erro
 handled on the UI thread between frames; pointer and keyboard input is injected as real egui
 events, one pointer event per frame.
 
+### Token
+
+Every connection must authenticate. At start the app makes a random 256-bit token for this
+launch and writes it, as one line of hex, to a file only the user can read:
+
+| System | Token file |
+|---|---|
+| Linux | `$XDG_DATA_HOME/solidcraft/control/PORT.token` (`~/.local/share/solidcraft/control/PORT.token`) |
+| macOS | `~/Library/Application Support/SolidCraft/control/PORT.token` |
+| Windows | `%LOCALAPPDATA%\SolidCraft\control\PORT.token` |
+
+On Unix the folder is `0700` and the file `0600`; on Windows the file's inherited permissions are
+replaced by a single entry for the user. `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_DIR` moves the folder. The file is
+removed when the app exits, and the next launch writes a new token. The token file's path is
+printed to stderr at start-up.
+
+The first request on a connection must carry the token as a top-level `"token"` member
+(`{"id": 1, "method": "ui.inspect", "params": {}, "token": "…"}`); later requests on the same
+connection may leave it out. A first line without the right token is answered with
+`{"ok": false, "error": "unauthorized: …"}` and the connection is closed, without running
+anything. Tokens are compared in constant time.
+
+`solidcraft-cli mcp --connect 127.0.0.1:PORT` reads the token file for that port by itself
+(`--token T` or `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN` give one explicitly). For a test harness, or a
+sandboxed package whose data folder the client can't see, start the app with
+`SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN` set to at least 32 hex characters (for example
+`openssl rand -hex 32`) and the app uses that token instead of making one; the file is still
+written. A one-line client in Python:
+
+```python
+token = (Path.home() / ".local/share/solidcraft/control/7878.token").read_text().strip()
+sock.sendall((json.dumps({"id": 1, "method": "ui.inspect", "params": {}, "token": token}) + "\n").encode())
+```
+
+### Limits
+
 The channel is untrusted input. A request line may be at most 16 MiB; a longer one is answered
 with `{"ok": false, "error": "request too large"}` and the connection is closed, as are
 connections that send eight lines that are not JSON. At most 16 connections are served at once
@@ -19,9 +55,9 @@ reads, writes or deletes (command paths such as `file.export`'s `path` or `doc.r
 `dir`, `ui.render`, `ui.screenshot`) must then lie inside one of those folders after `..` and
 symlinks are resolved, or the request fails with `… outside the folders this agent may use …`.
 The app adds its own recovery folder and, when it lies safely inside the home folder and not in
-a hidden folder, the open design's folder (whose hidden files stay out of reach). The bridged MCP server sends its folders this way on every request ([mcp.md](mcp.md)). Without
+a hidden folder, the open design's folder (whose hidden files stay out of reach). The bridged
-`allow_paths` file paths are not limited, and the channel itself has no authentication beyond
+MCP server sends its folders this way on every request ([mcp.md](mcp.md)). Without
-listening on loopback only.
+`allow_paths` file paths are not limited: a client holding the token can do what the user can.
 
 ## Engine
 

docs/mcp.md

@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ solidcraft --control 7878 &
 solidcraft-cli mcp --connect 127.0.0.1:7878
 ```
 
+Bridged, the server finds the app's control token in the token file the app wrote for that port
+([control-protocol.md](control-protocol.md#token)); `--token T` or `SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN` give
+it explicitly when the app runs in a sandbox whose data folder the server can't see (prefer the
+variable: command-line arguments are visible to other users in the process list).
+
 stdout carries only protocol messages; errors go to stderr. Bridged screenshots are written to a
 temporary file by the app and read back by the server, so both must run on the same machine.
 
@@ -67,6 +72,15 @@ folder of the design open in it, under the same rules, so give absolute paths: a
 resolves against the app's working folder, not the server's. The app's own
 file dialogs are never limited.
 
+### Tool annotations
+
+Each tool says what it may do, for clients that ask before running tools (or auto-approve on
+these hints). `list_commands`, `inspect_design`, `measure`, `body_topology` and `crash_reports`
+are read-only. `set_parameter`, `undo` and `redo` change the design undoably. `new_design`
+replaces it (destructive). `execute`, `batch`, `open`, `save`, `export` and `screenshot` (whose
+`path` writes a file) can read, write, overwrite or delete files: they are not read-only,
+`destructiveHint` and `openWorldHint` are true.
+
 ### Client configuration
 
 Claude Code (project `.mcp.json`, or `claude mcp add solidcraft -- solidcraft-cli mcp`; a setup

docs/releasing.md

@@ -98,6 +98,22 @@ new commits were added. An existing tag or published release is never overwritte
 version after publication. Do not push the version tag yourself: publishing the draft creates
 it at the draft's target commit.
 
+## Notes for the next release
+
+Items to carry into the next release's notes (step 3 below), then remove from here:
+
+- **Security (agents and the control channel, [#205](https://github.com/bherbruck/solidcraft/issues/205)).**
+  Upgrading is recommended for anyone who drives SolidCraft from an AI agent or runs it with
+  `--control` on a shared machine. MCP tool calls now reach files only in the open design's
+  folder (inside home, without its hidden files), SolidCraft's recovery folder and folders
+  given with `--allow-path`; `..`, symlinks that lead out and Windows UNC, device, stream and
+  short-name paths are refused ([#578](https://github.com/bherbruck/solidcraft/pull/578), thanks
+  @kravens). `doc.recovery_discard` deletes only real recovery entries. The control port now
+  needs a per-launch token from a file only the user can read, so other local users can't drive
+  the app; `solidcraft-cli mcp --connect` finds it by itself, other clients must send it (see
+  docs/control-protocol.md). MCP tool annotations no longer understate side effects. Reported by
+  @CalvinEthos.
+
 ## Verify and publish
 
 When the task authorizes shipping a release, agents should complete these steps without

examples/demo/enclosure_mcp.py

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import socket
 import subprocess
 import sys
 import time
+from pathlib import Path
 
 HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
 
@@ -63,10 +64,28 @@ class Mcp:
         self.p.wait(timeout=10)
 
 
+def control_token(port):
+    """The app's control token: SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN, else the token file the app wrote for
+    this port (docs/control-protocol.md)."""
+    if os.environ.get("SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN"):
+        return os.environ["SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN"].strip()
+    if os.environ.get("SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_DIR"):
+        folder = Path(os.environ["SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_DIR"])
+    elif sys.platform == "win32":
+        folder = Path(os.environ["LOCALAPPDATA"]) / "SolidCraft" / "control"
+    elif sys.platform == "darwin":
+        folder = Path.home() / "Library/Application Support/SolidCraft/control"
+    else:
+        data = os.environ.get("XDG_DATA_HOME") or str(Path.home() / ".local/share")
+        folder = Path(data) / "solidcraft" / "control"
+    return (folder / f"{port}.token").read_text().strip()
+
+
 def control(port, method, params=None):
     """One request on the app's control channel (camera moves)."""
     with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port)) as s:
-        s.sendall((json.dumps({"id": 1, "method": method, "params": params or {}}) + "\n").encode())
+        msg = {"id": 1, "method": method, "params": params or {}, "token": control_token(port)}
+        s.sendall((json.dumps(msg) + "\n").encode())
         buf = b""
         while not buf.endswith(b"\n"):
             chunk = s.recv(1 << 16)

packaging/linux/flatpak-smoke.py

@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ work=$(mktemp -d)
 export XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$work/config" XDG_DATA_HOME="$work/data" XDG_CACHE_HOME="$work/cache"
 mkdir -p "$XDG_CONFIG_HOME" "$XDG_DATA_HOME" "$XDG_CACHE_HOME"
 unset WGPU_BACKEND WGPU_BACKENDS
+# The control channel's token (docs/control-protocol.md), set here so this client knows it.
+SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN=$(od -An -N32 -tx1 /dev/urandom | tr -d ' \n')
+export SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN
 solidcraft --control 18837 >"$work/app.log" 2>&1 &
 app=$!
 cleanup() {
@@ -44,7 +47,7 @@ for ((attempt=0; attempt<300; attempt++)); do
   sleep .1
 done
 test "$ready" = 1
-for request in '{"id":1,"method":"ui.inspect","params":{}}' '{"id":2,"method":"engine.execute","params":{"command":"solid.box","params":{"length":30,"width":20,"height":10}}}' '{"id":3,"method":"document.inspect","params":{"measure":true}}'; do
+for request in "{\"id\":1,\"method\":\"ui.inspect\",\"params\":{},\"token\":\"$SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN\"}" '{"id":2,"method":"engine.execute","params":{"command":"solid.box","params":{"length":30,"width":20,"height":10}}}' '{"id":3,"method":"document.inspect","params":{"measure":true}}'; do
   printf '%s\n' "$request" >&3
   IFS= read -r -t 30 reply <&3
   printf '%s\n' "$reply"

packaging/linux/snap-smoke.py

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import signal
 import socket
 import subprocess
 import sys
+import secrets
 import tempfile
 import time
 
@@ -26,8 +27,10 @@ flatpak_smoke = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)
 _spec.loader.exec_module(flatpak_smoke)
 
 PORTS = {"x11": 18839, "wayland": 18840}
+# The control channel's token (docs/control-protocol.md), given to the app so this client knows it.
+TOKEN = secrets.token_hex(32)
 REQUESTS = [
-    {"id": 1, "method": "ui.inspect", "params": {}},
+    {"id": 1, "method": "ui.inspect", "params": {}, "token": TOKEN},
     {"id": 2, "method": "engine.execute",
      "params": {"command": "solid.box", "params": {"length": 30, "width": 20, "height": 10}}},
     {"id": 3, "method": "document.inspect", "params": {"measure": True}},
@@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ def run_backend(backend, out):
     runtime = Path(f"/run/user/{os.getuid()}")
     if not runtime.is_dir():
         raise RuntimeError(f"{runtime} is missing: snaps expect the login session's runtime directory")
-    env = dict(os.environ, XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=str(runtime))
+    env = dict(os.environ, XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=str(runtime), SOLIDCRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN=TOKEN)
     for name in ("WAYLAND_DISPLAY", "WAYLAND_SOCKET", "DISPLAY", "SOLIDCRAFT_WAYLAND", "SOLVECRAFT_WAYLAND"):
         env.pop(name, None)
     # The snap can write to the (non-hidden) home folder, not to the host's /tmp.