A horizontal or vertical glyph sat beside its line on a fixed side, so a
dimension placed on that side drew its value box on top of the glyph.
A glyph that would overlap a dimension's value now goes to the other side
of its line, or steps along it when both sides are taken.
The scenario `glyphs` check also fails when a glyph overlaps a dimension
value; constraint_glyphs_clear_of_dimensions covers it.
Fixes#175
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
sketch.construction set `construction` but left `centerline` on, so the
curve stayed a centerline (drawn dash-dot, still marked as an axis) until
it was first switched back to normal. Making a curve construction now
clears its centerline flag, mirroring sketch.centerline.
Nothing on the load path checked a sketch's size, and every sketch in the
timeline is solved when a design opens. The solver sizes its dense matrices by
the connected component, so a 30 MB file with 200,000 chained points asked the
allocator for terabytes and the process aborted, which no panic guard can
intercept.
Reject an oversized sketch while the design is still raw JSON, so the typed
arrays are never built, and refuse a connected component with more variables
than fits in a bounded matrix: that component now reports a failed solve and
leaves its geometry alone. 10,000 chained points went from 9.6 GB and 25
seconds to a failed solve in well under a second.
Fixes#145
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 04abbf95c26f68c7d0a126ed9e2827049f593361)
The control channel read each request with no length cap, so a client sending
gigabytes without a newline made the server thread allocate until the process
was killed. Read lines against the 16 MiB cap the MCP server already uses, now
one shared constant, answer a longer one with an error and close; close a
connection after eight lines that are not JSON, serve at most sixteen
connections at once, and run at most sixty-four queued requests per frame so a
flood cannot starve drawing.
Every file command checked the size with the metadata and then read to the end.
A character device such as /dev/zero reports a length of 0, so the cap passed
and the read was unbounded; a FIFO blocked the calling thread, which over the
control channel is the thread drawing the window. vfs::read now takes the
caller's cap, refuses anything that is not a regular file before opening it,
re-checks on the handle to close the window between the two, and reads no more
than the cap plus the byte that proves it was exceeded. Callers pass the limits
they already had, and the recovery read and the CLI's own reads go through it
too. `solvecraft-cli eval /dev/zero` and a FIFO now fail at once instead of
never returning.
Fixes#147
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 4156e8acd11c90c435a54a3b0ccc59991db71b12)
bherbruck