When STACKS_DIR is set, local managed stacks are stored in a flat
$STACKS_DIR/<stackName>/ layout instead of $DATA_DIR/stacks/<env>/<stack>/.
Existing stacks are not moved automatically and continue to resolve from
their existing locations. Invalid or unwritable STACKS_DIR values produce a
warning and fall back to $DATA_DIR/stacks instead of aborting startup. With
this layout, local stack names must be unique across environments.
Hawser agents report their remote stacks directory on hello. That path is
persisted on the environment as hawser_stacks_dir so compose APIs and the UI
can show host paths rather than Dockhand staging paths. Staging paths are
remapped to and from the remote stack dir for compose files, backups, and
environment settings. Backup restore may write under either the default
staging root or the configured STACKS_DIR.
Co-authored-by: xd003 <[email protected]>
* feat: add branch selection to Git Stack modal with branches API endpoint
- Add branch dropdown in create mode (fetches branches from new API endpoint)
- Add branch field in edit mode for existing Git stacks
- Remove redundant branch badge next to repository URL in edit mode
- Add POST /api/git/branches endpoint to list available branches
- Export buildGitEnv, buildRepoUrl, execGit from git.ts for reuse
* cla: recheck with correct author email
* fix: harden git branches endpoint and fix credential resolution
* feat(git-stacks): per-stack branch override
Add a per-stack 'branch' column to git_stacks so each stack can deploy
from a branch different from its repository's default.
- Migration 0012 (drizzle + drizzle-pg): add nullable 'branch' column
- resolveStackBranch() in git.ts: effective branch = per-stack override,
else repository default; wired into sync/deploy/test paths
- db.ts: persist/read branch; GitStackData.branch is string | null
- API routes (preview-env, stacks create/update): honor explicit branch
override with partial-update semantics (null/empty clears the override)
- UI: GitStackModal shows a 'Repository default' sentinel + per-stack
selector; GitSourceBadge displays effective branch with a '(per-stack)'
marker; stacks page passes through the per-stack branch
- tests/git-stack-branch.test.ts: unit coverage for resolveStackBranch
and effective-branch display semantics
* feat(git-branches): security hardening per PR #1343 maintainer review
Adopts the three security recommendations from the maintainer review on
the git-branch-stack feature:
1. SSRF guard (assertSafeBranchTarget)
New src/lib/server/git-branch-lookup.ts rejects repository URLs that
point at private/loopback/link-local addresses before any git
subprocess is spawned. Covers IPv4 (127/8, 169.254/16, 10/8,
172.16/12, 192.168/16, 100.64/10, 0/8), IPv6 (::1, fe80::/10,
fc00::/7, ::), IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:a.b.c.d), and a 25-entry
hostname denylist (localhost, metadata.google.internal,
host.docker.internal, etc.). Raw-URL parse only — no DNS resolution,
avoiding TOCTOU/rebinding. Runs on BOTH the url and repositoryId
paths (a stored repo's URL could also point internal).
2. Credential-exfiltration guard (assertCredentialUrlPair)
A raw url paired with a stored credentialId is only allowed when the
credential is plausibly for that host. SSH and none credentials are
always allowed (no secret to leak). Password credentials: allowed
when the username equals the URL host, or when the credential name
(or its hyphen/underscore-separated segments) equals the host or its
first label (e.g. "github-pat" → github.com). Inference-based — no
new DB column. The repositoryId path is not subject to this guard
(the pairing is the user's own stored config).
3. Timeout on git subprocesses
execGit now accepts a timeoutMs parameter (default GIT_TIMEOUT_MS =
20s, env-overridable). On timeout the process is killed with SIGKILL
and the caller receives { timedOut: true, code: 124 }. Applied to all
execGit call sites (clone, pull, fetch, ls-remote, etc.) so a dead
or black-holed remote cannot stall a request indefinitely.
OpenAPI: @openapi JSDoc block added to the branches endpoint; spec
regenerated via the upstream generator (359/359 coverage, all 6 gates
pass). /api/git/branches POST entry added to openapi.generated.json.
Svelte5: fix-svelte-optional-params.sh applied to 7 .svelte files
(x?: T → x: T = undefined) to work around esbuild's rejection of
TS-only optional-parameter syntax in lang="ts" script tags.
Tests: 59 tests in tests/git-branches.test.ts covering SSRF (blocked
IPs, boundary cases), credential affinity (allowed/rejected cases),
endpoint pipeline ordering, and parseRepoHost edge cases.
Rebased onto upstream/main (a485c85) — zero conflicts; GitStackModal.svelte
had not drifted since the branch was created.
* fix(git): close SSRF/RCE/exfil gaps across all git URL+credential endpoints (PR #1343 re-review)
1. SSRF: replace hand-rolled assertSafeBranchTarget with shared URL()-based
isSafeNotificationUrl — blocks decimal/octal/hex/short-form IPv4 and
v4-mapped IPv6 encodings (all six maintainer bypass payloads now blocked).
ALL schemes (http/https/ssh/git/scp-like) now judge the CANONICALIZED
host through that single check: non-http(s) schemes can't be passed to
URL() as-is, so the parsed host (port-stripped, IPv6 bracketed only
when it contains a colon) is run through isSafeNotificationUrl under
an https:// scheme. Closes the ssh/git encoded-IP bypass (decimal
2130706433, hex 0x7f000001, short-form 127.1 over ssh://, git:// and
scp-like all resolve to 127.0.0.1 and are now blocked).
2. Credential affinity: drop the dead second rule — with rule (i) being
username === host, the single-label variant was identical and unreachable.
3. listRemoteBranches + testRepositoryConfig call assertSafeRepoUrl explicitly
so the ext::/file:: transport denylist holds on every path into a git
subprocess, not only via buildRepoUrl.
4. preview-env: assertSafeRepoTarget (SSRF+RCE) + repoFilePath containment for
composePath/envFilePath (path traversal) + assertCredentialHostMatch
(exfil).
5. repositories/test: assertSafeRepoTarget + assertCredentialHostMatch.
Tests: 134 across 3 files (git-branches, preview-env-security,
repositories-test-security) — lock the six http(s) encoding bypasses, the
four ssh/git encoded-IP payloads at unit and endpoint level, the subdomain
attack, single-label username, path traversal, and the endpoint pipelines.
Verified safe (no change): backup/destinations/test, registries/test,
environments/test, git/repositories CRUD, git/stacks, git/repositories/[id]/test.
* fix(git): address branch stack review feedback
- scope remote branch lookup timeout to ls-remote only
- require git:edit permission for preview-env
- clarify SSRF policy while preserving private LAN Git hosts
- support free-text branch selection for new repositories
- share production branch resolution logic with tests and UI
- add testable preview-env request pipeline
Jarek Krochmalski